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support the hypothesis that economic grievances are behind these electoral 
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and age varies considerably between countries, suggesting that generalisations of 
radical right voters as older and less well educated are unfounded. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction, Motivation and Research Design 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The political landscape of Europe is in turmoil. In both national (Figure 1) and European 
parliament elections (Figure 2) social democratic parties face stagnation or decline, suffering 
crippling electoral defeats in recent votes in Greece, the Netherlands and France, and a falling 
vote share in much of the rest of the EU-15. Meanwhile, parties of the radical right, animated 
by nationalism, hostility to immigration and the European project, and riding a populist 
backlash against perceived ‘corrupt elites’ have risen from obscurity across Europe, winning 
increasing shares of the popular vote and becoming, in many countries, genuine contenders 
for political power (Figure 1 and 2). While waves of electoral support for radical right parties 
have been witnessed before in post-WWII Europe, never before has this trend been so 
sustained and generalised across such a number of European states (Arzheimer, 2008). The 
radical right has seen gains not only in countries where it held a traditional foothold, such as 
France, Italy and Austria, but also in countries which previously appeared politically 
impervious to its appeal, such as the Netherlands, Germany, the Nordics and even the UK.  
 
How are we to explain these two trends? Are they independent of one another or are they 
twin symptomatic features of common economic and demographic changes under way in 
Europe? Can a generalised analysis of the determinants of these processes be made for the 
whole of the European Union or are the forces behind these electoral patterns distinct for 
different member states? The available literature has generally considered these phenomena 
as distinct, with different researchers, analysing different countries over different election 
years; varyingly attributing the rise of the radical right to socioeconomic grievances, mass 
immigration or a combination of the two (Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Rygen & Ruth, 2013; 
Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Stockhemer, 2017). The comparatively minimal literature on the 
decline of European social democracy attributes its decline to a failure to articulate a 
compelling counter narrative to the problems of the prevailing political and economic order 
(Egle, 2009; Karreth et al, 2012), to vacillation over issues of immigration (Bale et al, 2010; 
Schmidtke, 2017) or to the erosion of its traditional voter base (Pits et al, 2017).  
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Figure 1. Average Social Democratic and Radical Right Vote Share, National Elections – EU 15. Showing 
the average vote share for all national legislative elections for the years 2000-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. 
For the definition of political parties used, see Chapter 3, section 1. Source: European Election Database and 
national statistics offices. 
 
 
Figure 2. Total Social Democratic and Radical Right Vote Share, EU Parliament – EU-15. Showing the 
number of votes cast for social democratic and radical right parties as a share of total valid votes for the 
European Parliament elections 2004-2014. For the definition of political parties used, see Chapter 3, section 1. 
Source: European Election Database and national statistics offices. 
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While evidence has been found for the influence of all of these factors, especially 
immigration and unemployment, one factor has been comparatively overlooked, namely, the 
declining share of manufacturing employment. Technological change and, to a lesser extent 
trade liberalisation, has seen the number of manufacturing workers as a share of total 
employment fall precipitously. While this process is nothing new, stretching back to the 
1960s and 1970s in many European states, its impact has been dramatic since the 1990s. 
These processes have fundamentally transformed the composition of the labour force in the 
developed world. While the share of workers employed in routine and repetitive manual 
labour has declined a new class of better formally educated, more cognitive workers has 
emerged (Goos & Manning, 2007; Goos et al, 2009). Aging populations, changing 
consumption habits and a rising feminisation of the labour force has seen the service and care 
sector swell, coupled with the demise of both the unionised ‘family wage’ factory job and the 
identity of the working-class patriarch (Lindley, 2012; Dwyer, 2013). These changes can be 
expected to impact upon voting patterns in a number of ways. The emergence of a new 
demographic of educated cognitive workers, divorced from the political and cultural 
institutions of their parents may seek to expression own political identity either from an 
abandonment of the social democratic left or through the embrace of radical right parties and 
their vision of an exclusory national community. Low skilled workers in service and care 
occupations at the bottom end of the wage distribution, along with the elderly, unemployed 
and infirm may feel threatened by the influx of foreign workers, both in terms of labour 
market competition and in terms of perceived pressures on public services. Finally, declining 
union density and the waning strength of the European labour movement may unpick 
traditional loyalties to social democratic parties, pushing workers into the orbit of radical 
right parties. 
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1.2 Motivation 
 
This paper is not only motivated by a gap in the literature analysing the influence of declining 
manufacturing employment on the vote share of social democratic and radical right parties. 
Rather, it is also motivated by a desire to establish a set of applicable policy prescriptions. 
European social democracy was instrumental in the establishment of the welfare state, worker 
participation in company decision making and the alleviation of the inequities of income and 
wealth inequality. The rise of radical right parties presents an existential threat to the 
achievements of open societies. Free movement of labour and economic integration have 
facilitated general improvements in the lives of ordinary people, while the institutions of the 
European Union have fostered peace and cooperation between European neighbours (Boltho 
& Eichengreen, 2008). The victory of radical right political parties threatens to undermine, 
even overturn, these accomplishments. Economic nationalism could spark a protectionist 
trade war that would bring ruin to businesses and employees, with prices rising, wages falling 
and unemployment appearing everywhere on the up. The rise of a political nationalism based 
on ethnicity, religion or language risks spreading violence and discord amongst the diverse 
populations of Europe. While a break-up of the European Union could mean not only the 
diminished position of European states on the world stage but even outright political conflict 
between nations. 
 
In making a small but unique contribution to the academic literature on these topics this paper 
hopes to provide an impetus for policy makers, civil society and the labour movement to 
better address the underlying factors contributing to the rise of the radical right and the 
malaise of European social democracy. Identification of declining manufacturing 
employment as a key determinant in these trends may be taken as cause to improve human 
capital investment, lifelong training or even more radical proposals, such as a universal basic 
income. Whereas, the identification of an impact of immigration on voting patterns may 
necessitate improved integration procedures, greater investment in public services, and the 
improvement and enforcement of workers’ and tenants’ rights. 
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1.3 Research Design 
 
Utilising an original dataset gathered by the author from a range of sources this paper 
analyses the impact of manufacturing employment, unemployment, the crude rate of net 
migration, GDP, age and education on the share of social democratic and radical right votes. 
With the aim of establishing robust findings on both the European and national level this 
paper employs data gathered on a regional level at two levels of aggregation. It furthermore 
investigates the impact of these factors on both European parliament elections and national 
legislative elections. Two baseline models are employed, both using fixed effects, to control 
for regional, temporal and country based variation on both the European and national level. 
Beginning with a review of the current academic debate on these issues, this paper presents a 
theoretical discussion, analysing the factors behind manufacturing employment decline and 
drawing hypotheses on the impact declining manufacturing employment on the vote share of 
social democratic and radical right parties. The paper then presents a detailed account of the 
data sources and data management techniques employed to derive the datasets used in this 
analysis. Following this the paper shall present the model used and discuss the motivation 
and objectives behind its use. The results are then presented and robustness checks carried 
out. The paper then discusses the key findings derived from this analysis within the context 
of previous literature and theory, while highlighting limitations to the study that restrict the 
generalisability of the results. Finally, the paper presents a set of conclusions, policy 
recommendations and suggestions for possible avenues for further research. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theory 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
No previous study has attempted to combine an analysis of both the declining vote share of 
social democratic parties and the rise of the radical right on a European and country level. 
Nevertheless, there exists a wide range of related literature, examining one or more aspects of 
these phenomena. The literature analysing the factors influencing the rise of the radical right 
is extensive and growing. Whereas, the literature analysing the decline of European social 
democracy is comparatively slim. This section shall provide a critical review of the available 
literature, building on the findings of these papers to structure the methodology employed in 
this papers research. 
 
The literature on the voting patterns of the radical right span several academic disciplines, 
utilising a variety of quantitative and qualitative methodologies and ranging in focus from 
single country studies to the analysis of Western Europe as a whole. Disagreement exists in 
the literature over the primary factors shaping the electoral performance of the radical right. 
Some research suggests that economic hardship, normally measured through unemployment, 
is the primary factor, while other research explains the rise of the radical right through 
immigration, while others still point to a combination of factors (Ford and Goodwin, 2010; 
Rygen & Ruth, 2013; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Stockhemer, 2017). A significant degree of 
this disagreement can be explained by the different foci of these papers, with different 
researchers analysing different countries at different periods in time (Ark, 2012).  
 
Analysing the impact of trade exposure to China and Eastern Europe on German voting 
patterns from 1987 to 2009, Dippel et al (2016) find a positive association between increased 
trade integration and votes for radical right parties. The authors argue that trade shocks 
brought about by liberalisation led to a decline in manufacturing employment, with low-skill 
manufacturing workers expressing their discontent through an increased tendency to vote for 
the radical right (Dippel, 2016). These findings are expanded upon by Dippel and others in a 
2017 paper that finds strong statistical association between a local labour market’s exposure 
to trade shocks and votes for radical right parties through the intermediate variable of a 
decline in manufacturing employment (Dippel et al, 2017). These findings suggest that, at 
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least for Germany, declining manufacturing employment may be strongly associated with 
voting outcomes for radical right parties. These studies, furthermore, provide a possible 
profile of voters for the radical right; namely white working-class males, adversely affected 
by the decline of manufacturing jobs. This voter profile finds support in two studies carried 
out by Ford and Goodwin (2010, 2014). Using individual survey data, the researchers find 
support for the British National Party (BNP) and United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) to be concentrated amongst older, less well educated working class males who feel 
‘left behind’ by changes in the labour market (Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014). The studies by 
Dippel et al may, however, overestimate the significance of trade liberalisation on the decline 
in manufacturing employment. There is intense debate in the literature over the causes of this 
decline with other researchers emphasising the role of automation over trade (Berger & Frey, 
2016b). Given the increasing academic consensus about the primary influence of 
technological change in determining the erosion of manufacturing employment, it might be 
preferable to examine the impact of manufacturing employment on votes for radical right 
parties directly, rather than through exposure to trade. This claim, that votes for the radical 
right are associated with areas that have been ‘left behind’ finds support in a paper by 
Rydgren and Ruth (2013). Analysing the electoral performance of the Sweden Democrats in 
the 2010 Swedish election on a municipal level through OLS the authors find robust positive 
correlation between unemployment and votes for the Sweden Democrats and robust negative 
correlation for average income (Rygen & Ruth, 2013). The authors find no positive 
correlation between the proportion of non-European immigrants and votes for the radical 
right, while they find a substantial positive correlation between votes for the radical right in 
districts neighbouring those with high levels of immigration. These findings are of course 
limited given that they cover only one year for one country. They furthermore contrast with 
findings for other countries and periods. Using municipal data for the 1998 Latvian general 
election and a similar OLS model Bloom (2012) finds no support for an association between 
economic hardship (measured by unemployment, tax ranking and the development index) 
and votes for the radical right. Indeed, the study finds that voters in the municipalities with 
the worst economic conditions were the least likely to vote for the radical right (Bloom, 
2012). 
 
While these country level studies provide support for the hypothesis that regional economic 
factors and industrial dynamics play a primary role in explaining voting patterns for radical 
right parties, other, cross national studies suggest that immigration is the decisive factor. 
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Analysing data from the 2002/2003 European Social Survey for 11 European countries using 
a range of socio-economic control variables and both a binary logistic regression and 
multivariate regression analysis Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) find concern over immigration 
to be both more strongly statistically associated with preference for radical right parties and a 
stronger predictor of radical right preference than economic grievances. These findings are 
supported by similar studies using survey data from the 2002/2003 European Social Survey 
for different country cohorts, using differing models (Arzheimer, 2008; Oesch, 2008; 
Rydgren, 2008). It should be noted, however, that all of these studies rely exclusively on 
electoral data from individual national elections held in the late 1990s and early 2000s; 
therefore, these findings may not be representative of either the determinants of recent 
electoral patterns or electoral patterns over a longer period. Furthermore, considerable doubt 
has been expressed over the cross-cultural validity of cross-national survey data as a basis for 
analysing the electoral success of the radical right. Hooghe and Reeskens (2007) highlight 
strong measurement biases and vast differences in response levels to the European Social 
Survey, arguing that anything between 15 to 90 percent of the electoral strength of the radical 
right vote may be covered in these surveys. This suggests that harmonised macroeconomic 
data gathered on a regional/municipal basis might prove a better methodological approach to 
analysing these phenomena than data drawn from surveys. 
 
Somewhat more nuanced findings emerge from single country studies utilising disaggregated 
data from multiple election years. Halla et al (2017) analyse municipal level data for all 
Austrian elections between 1971 and 2011 using a fixed effect model to explore the 
association between immigration, socio-economic conditions and votes for the radical right 
FPÖ. The authors find that immigration explains around a tenth of regional variation in votes 
for the FPÖ (Halla et al, 2017). The impact of immigration varies however based on the skill 
share of the immigrant population, a high percentage of low- and medium-skilled immigrants 
is found to be positively associated with votes for the radical right, while high-skilled 
immigration is found to be either insignificant or negatively associated with the radical right 
vote (Halla et al, 2017). However, the authors link this more to concerns over loss of cultural 
identity than to concern over labour market competition. The model employed in this paper 
includes a range of socioeconomic control variables, including, critically, the industrial 
structure of the municipality. While the authors find positive statistical association between 
unemployment and votes for the radical right they do not find any significant influence from 
the municipal industrial structure (Halla et al, 2017). This could suggest that a declining share 
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of employment in manufacturing is not an important factor explaining the rise of the radical 
right in Austria during this period; however, the variable chosen subdivides employment by 
31 sectors, suggesting that the impact of manufacturing employment may not be optimally 
controlled for. In a study influenced by the approach undertaken by Halla et al (2017), Becker 
and Fetzer (2016) examine the impact of migration from EU accession countries on votes for 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the European Union parliamentary 
elections from 1999 to 2014, finding a strong and robust statistical association between 
migration shocks and votes for the radical right. The paper explains the mechanism of this 
impact through a weakening of wages at the bottom end of the income scale and increased 
pressure on public services and housing (Becker & Fetzer, 2016). However, it should be 
noted that, as the focus of the study is to examine the impact of migration shocks – as well as 
labour markets and access to public services – on voting patterns, the paper does not directly 
explore the influence of manufacturing employment and unemployment on votes for the 
radical right (Becker & Fetzer, 2016).  
 
The paper that is arguably closest to the current analysis, in terms of its focus and the data 
used is Stockhemer (2017). Using an original dataset compiled and harmonised from national 
accounts data Stockhemer analyses the vote share for radical right parties on a NUTS 2 level 
for 17 European countries between 1990 and 2013. Employing a Tobit panel data model, the 
paper analyses the impact of voter turn-out, immigration, unemployment, population density 
and education (measured as the percentage of citizens with a university degree) on the 
combined regional vote for all radical right parties (Stockhemer, 2017). The paper finds that 
radical right parties fare better in regions with a high percentage of university educated 
citizens, rural regions and regions with a high percentage of immigration (Stockhemer, 2017). 
This approach is coupled with a dynamic specification to evaluate the impact of changes in 
these independent variables on votes for the radical right, finding that an average increase in 
unemployment and an average increase in the percentage of university educated citizens is 
associated with a better performance for radical right parties (Stockhemer, 2017). The paper 
emphasises, however, that while increases in unemployment are associated with increases in 
votes for the radical right, high unemployment alone is not associated with a high vote share 
for radical right parties (Stockhemer, 2017). These findings suggest a different socio-
economic profile for radical right voters on a European level than that previously discussed 
and suggest that both immigration and unemployment shocks play a role in determining the 
electoral performance of radical right parties. The paper does not however provide detailed 
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analysis of country level variation and does not include a measure manufacturing 
employment.  
 
Given the extensive body of work on the growth and determinants of votes for radical right 
parties, the electoral performance of the social democratic centre-left has been comparatively 
overlooked. The literature that is available is, furthermore, largely theoretical, even 
polemical, highlighting the need for greater quantitative analysis. An exception to this can be 
found in Karreth et al (2012). Drawing on electoral data for Germany, Sweden and Great 
Britain for the years 1979-2006, the authors argue that while political moderation and a 
movement toward centrist liberal policies during the 1990s initially boosted electoral support 
for social democratic parties, this increase in support was not sustained (Karreth et al, 2012). 
Over time movement to the centre ground drove core voters to parties on the radical left or 
into political abstention (Karreth et al, 2012). It should be noted however that this period of 
analysis omits the more recent rise of radical right parties in these countries. This claim, that 
declining support for social democracy can be linked to a policy malaise and an abandonment 
of traditional supporters is however echoed elsewhere, with Egle (2009) arguing that the 
German SPD has failed to articulate an effective policy programme that differentiates them 
from the Christian Democrats while also experiencing a sustained crisis in leadership. 
Discussing the changing political landscape following the global financial crisis Rilling 
(2011) argues that social democracy has failed to exploit the opportunities provided by the 
crisis, pursuing policy largely indistinguishable from that of the centre-right. The significance 
of the impact of the global financial crisis on social democratic electoral performance is 
further highlighted by the 2013 analysis undertaken by LeDuc and Pammett. Analysing the 
electoral performance of governing parties in 24 EU states between June 2008 and December 
2011 the authors find that social democratic parties were disproportionately adversely 
affected (LeDuc & Pammett, 2013). Social democratic and centre-left led governments in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, the UK, Spain and Portugal fell from power, while the German 
SPD suffered its worst ever electoral performance, with the centre-right parties being the 
primary beneficiary (LeDuc & Pammett, 2013). Only in Greece and Slovenia did centre-left 
parties defeat centre-right governments, though for the Greek social democratic party 
PASOK this proved to be a Pyrrhic victory, with the party being replaced by a technocratic 
government in November 2011 and suffering massive electoral losses in the general election 
of 2012 (LeDuc & Pammett, 2013). While this shift appears dramatic the authors, 
nonetheless, highlight that these electoral patterns cannot solely be attributed to the crisis; 
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political parties often see their vote share fall while in office, nevertheless the average 
electoral losses were found to be around two percentage points higher than that experienced 
by the same governing parties during previous electoral cycles during periods of economic 
growth (LeDuc & Pammett, 2013). The paper highlights that the electoral performance of the 
radical right was mixed, but registered gains in the Netherlands, Finland, Bulgaria, Austria, 
Hungary and Lithuania (LeDuc & Pammett, 2013). While these findings are illustrative of an 
impact of the crisis on social democratic parties it should, nonetheless, be noted that the 
electoral years chosen omit important countries such as France and that the categorisation of 
political parties used by the authors is problematic; with Ireland’s Fianna Fáil, being referred 
to as a social democratic party when it is in fact a party of the centre to centre-right, as 
evidenced by their membership of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party 
(ALDE). 
 
Magnus Ryner argues that the origins of the crisis of social democracy have deeper roots, 
with European social democracy failing to respond to economic turmoil in the 1990s, 
rescinding on traditional support for the welfare state and failing to produce a counter 
narrative to neoliberalism (Ryner, 2010). Factors that placed these parties in a weakened 
position come the financial crisis, writing that “modern European social democracy is so 
deeply imbricated with the system that is in crisis that it is in no position to offer an 
alternative to it” (Ryner, 2010: 555). For the writers of a 2017 working paper for the 
Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) the crisis of social democracy is less a 
matter of policy malaise and more fundamentally one of the erosion of its traditional voting 
base (Pitts et al, 2017). Declining manufacturing employment, argue the authors, has 
precipitated the breakdown of the communities and institutions that both gave rise to social 
democracy and sustained it during the twentieth century (Pitts et al, 2017).  
 
Examining the German SPD Schmidtke (2017) argues that a long-term voter loyalty was 
established between immigrants to Germany and German social democracy. This loyalty, 
argues Schmidtke, had its origins in the blue-collar background of the overwhelming majority 
of immigrants coming to Germany from the 1950s-1990s. This support base amongst migrant 
workers contributed to the perception of the SPD as the ‘Party for immigrants’, with the SPD 
unwilling to address concerns over immigration amongst its support base in the white 
working class, while also failing to consistently defend the rights of immigrants, enabling 
both the centre-right and radical right to make inroads amongst SPD voters (Schmidtke, 
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2017). Bale et al (2010), also argue that immigration and the indecisive policy approach of 
the European social democratic parties has strengthened the hand of the radical right. They 
highlight, however, that social democratic policy has been far from uniform across Europe, 
with those adopting a more anti-immigrant policy direction not necessarily benefitting as a 
result (Bale et al, 2010). The authors argue that rather than directly adopting the policies of 
the radical right or providing a principled agenda setting narrative on the benefits of 
immigration, they have instead attempted to mix and match contradictory policy and rhetoric 
(Bale et al, 2010). However, employing OLS and a fixed effect model to analyse the impact 
of immigration on votes for political parties in Denmark during the 1990s Gerdes and 
Wadensjö (2010) find no statistical impact on votes for the Danish Social Democrats. 
 
Taken together the papers discussed in this section suggest that manufacturing employment, 
unemployment and immigration may be significant factors in explaining the electoral 
performance of both social democratic parties and parties of the radical right. The findings of 
Stockhemer (2017) suggest that education may be of significance, at least for radical right 
parties, while the survey data discussed by Ford and Goodwin (2010, 2014) suggest that age 
may be a factor. The lack of multi-country analysis using manufacturing employment data 
further motivates this papers line of research. Likewise, the relative scarcity of papers 
analysing the influence of economic and demographic factors on votes for social democratic 
parties highlights the important individual contribution that this paper stands to make to the 
literature. The data management employed by the quantitative papers discussed in this section 
highlight the necessity of undertaking analysis using harmonised data on a high level of 
disaggregation. They also suggest that more subjective factors, that are difficult if not 
impossible to adequately quantify, such as the perceived effectiveness of party leaders may 
play an important role. Finally, the differing results identified by the papers, in terms of the 
relative significance of different factors suggest that results may differ between countries and 
for different kinds of elections. This suggests that detailed analysis should be undertaken not 
only on a European level, but also for individual European countries. 
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2.2 Theoretical Approach 
 
Recent decades have seen seismic shifts in the structure and composition of the labour force. 
The share of employment in manufacturing has declined precipitously, dropping in the EU-15 
from an average of around 38 percent in the early 1970s to around 13 percent today (Figure 
3) bringing with it profound changes in the way in which people live and work in the 
developed world.  
 
 
Figure 3. Manufacturing Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment. Showing manufacturing 
employment as a percentage of total employment, quarterly data, seasonally and calendar adjusted. Source: 
Eurostat - namq_nace10_e  
 
Globalisation, outsourcing and shifts in institutional frameworks have each played an 
important role in these processes but the primary driving force has been technological change 
(Berger & Frey, 2016b). Computational power has risen exponentially, doubling every 18-24 
months, in accordance with Moore’s Law (Bonekamp, 2016), facilitating the mechanisation 
of industrial production and the unprecedented expansion of international communication and 
logistics (Berger & Frey, 2016b). While the impact of the ICT revolution is ongoing, 
numerous observers have heralded the outbreak of a fourth industrial revolution (European 
Commission, 2016: 174). The emergence of Machine Learning and Mobile Robotics, appear 
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set to radically automate both physical and cognitive tasks previously performed by workers, 
both in manufacturing and beyond (Frey & Osborne, 2013; Arnts et al, 2016; Degryse, 2016). 
Understanding the impact of this ongoing decline in manufacturing employment on voting 
patterns is therefore of vital importance. One of the major theoretical explanations for the 
dynamics behind this process is Routine-Biased Technological Change (RBTC) developed by 
Autor and Acemoglu (Autor et al., 2003; Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). This approach perceives 
occupations as composed of bundles of tasks that can be categorised as being either routine or 
non-routine and either cognitive or manual in content. The theory argues that the composition 
of these occupational task bundles changes over time with advances in technology replacing 
routine-manual and routine-cognitive tasks and reducing demand for those occupations with a 
high intensity of routine tasks. 
 
The impact of these processes on votes for social democratic and radical right parties can be 
theorised in a number of ways. The destruction of old jobs and the creation of new jobs does 
not in itself ensure that workers will move up the income scale let alone find secure and 
dignified employment. Manufacturing jobs involve a high intensity of manual/cognitive 
routine tasks. Furthermore, they traditionally provided secure employment and wages in the 
middle of the earnings distribution. Through RBTC these forms of employment are rendered 
obsolete through the substitution of labour with capital (Lindley, 2012). In their place are 
substituted middle earning distribution employment requiring the performance of non-routine 
tasks that often require high levels of formal education and training. Securing stable 
reasonably well-paid employment therefore entails a ‘race’ between changing labour market 
dynamics and human capital accumulation (Goldin & Katz, 2008). Those workers who find 
themselves unable to access the necessary education and training are therefore pushed out of 
the middle-income bracket and forced to take up non-routine manual and cognitive work, 
such as construction, care and food services, that are normally at the low end of the income 
spectrum and which are often precarious (Goos et al, 2009, Lindley, 2012; Dwyer, 2013).  
 
Those negatively affected by this polarisation of the labour force may feel increasingly 
discontent or disillusioned with the status quo, abandoning their traditional political party of 
choice and either abstaining from political involvement or supporting populist parties of the 
radical right. Conversely, this emergent class of highly educated cognitive workers may no 
longer feel a political affinity with the party to which they or their family formally 
subscribed, leading them to seek new forms of political expression. Finally, the decline in 
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manufacturing employment has been one of the major contributing factors to the decline of 
union density in Europe and the developed world (Lee, 2005). Separation of workers and 
their families from unionised employment and the institutions of the labour movement could, 
therefore, erode their ties with social democratic parties. The erosion of class identity brought 
about by this process could furthermore foster increased personal identification with one’s 
nation, contributing to support for the radical right.  
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Chapter 3. Data and Data Management 
 
3.1 Data Sources and Overall Management 
 
The primary objective in gathering and managing the data was to produce one or more 
datasets that combine the highest possible number of observations at the lowest level of 
regional aggregation with the fullest possible range of independent variables. The gathering 
and management of the data was also motivated by both a desire to maximise the number of 
EU states, in order to examine both Europe as a whole and country-by-country variation, 
while also to avoid countries that constitute clear outliers in terms of election patterns*. As 
with all econometric analysis the gathering of this data and the specification of the models 
was motivated on the one hand by a need to include suitable and sufficient variables and 
thereby avoid omitted variable bias but also to avoid the inclusion of variables that are highly 
correlated, which could lead to multicollinearity problems (Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 477, 
321). Marrying these different objectives and deriving the best possible datasets invariably 
involved a balancing act with these different objectives at times running up against one 
another. Decisions over the management of the data were moreover shaped by the availability 
and consistency of the data itself. This section provides an explanation of the main sources 
used to gather the data and the rationale behind the overall data management. Detailed 
explanations of the data management undertaken for different variables can be found in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter, with descriptive statistics of the final datasets and tests 
for multicollinearity presented at the end. Specific citations on the data sources used for all 
variables along with the relevant declarations can be found in the data references section 
prior to the literature references at the end of this paper.  
 
Based on the literature discussed in previous chapters and the research aims outlined in the 
first chapter the following variables were chosen: 
 
Dependent variables: 
Share of votes for social democratic parties. 
Share of votes for radical right parties. 
																																																						
*	I am referring here only to countries in which radical right parties gain less than one percent on a national 
level. 
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Independent variables: 
Share of manufacturing employment. 
Unemployment rate. 
Crude rate of net migration. 
GDP 
Age 
Education 
 
In order to gather consistent regional data on a European and national level only data 
referring to Eurostat’s Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics (henceforth referred to 
as NUTS) was used. The NUTS framework provides regional units on a hierarchy of three 
levels, NUTS 1, which divides the EU into 98 regions, NUTS 2, which divides the EU into 
273 regions and NUTS 3, which divides the EU into 1324 regions. These NUTS regions have 
been subject to regular, albeit generally minor, changes during their history, creating some 
difficulties for analysis over time. Therefore, for the sake of consistency this paper uses only 
data gathered on the basis of the NUTS categories as defined in the NUTS 2010 regional 
classification system, the details of which can be found in the relevant Eurostat working 
paper (European Commission, 2011). Data inconsistencies were dealt with either by omission 
of the region(s) in question, by aggregation of microdata in a manner methodologically 
identical with that of the NUTS data or, in some instances, through the interpolation of 
missing values. The details of precisely how this was done for each variable are included in 
this, and following sections, of this chapter.  
 
Three primary data sources were used to gather the data for the variables listed above. The 
majority of the election data was gathered from the European Election and Referendum 
Database (EED), an online database gathered by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. 
This data source provides NUTS 1-3 level election data for national and European elections 
for all political parties gaining over one percent of the national vote from 1990 onwards. It 
should be noted however that this dataset has not been consistently updated for a number of 
years and that it contains increasing omissions and inconsistencies from around 2009 
onwards. The EED database is itself is drawn from European national election authorities, 
national statistical agencies and other official sources. Therefore, recent years missing from 
the database were gathered by the author from the same sources using the same methodology. 
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The economic and demographic data used to construct the independent variables was derived 
either from the Eurostat regional databases, which provide harmonised regional data from 
2000-2015, or from the Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database (ERD); a 
database derived from Eurostat data and data obtained from AMECO, with the data being 
reconfigured to produce consistent harmonised data for a number of variables on a NUTS 
2010 basis for the years 1980-2014. Combining data from these datasets it was possible to 
gather data for a sufficient number of countries and regions from 2000 until 2014. While this 
period of analysis omits important recent electoral years for a number of European countries, 
such as the Danish 2015 election, and the French, Dutch and Austrian elections of 2017 it 
would have been difficult to incorporate all of these elections within the same dataset. The 
advantages of beginning the analysis earlier than this would, furthermore, have been limited; 
given that the electoral phenomena of interest in this paper, namely a declining vote share for 
social democratic parties and the rise of the radical right appear as broad European trends 
only after the year 2000. Furthermore, extending the period of analysis further back in time 
would have complicated the creation of data based on European Parliament elections, given 
the process of European enlargement. 
 
Given the objective of undertaking analysis on the lowest level of aggregation it would be 
preferable to undertake all analysis on a NUTS 3 level. However, neither the Eurostat nor 
Cambridge Econometrics databases contain data on all of the independent variables specified 
above on a NUTS 3 level. The data needed to derive the share of employment in 
manufacturing along with migration and GDP are all available on a NUTS 3 level, while the 
unemployment rate, and data on population by age group and educational attainment are only 
available on a NUTS 2 level. It was not possible to derive NUTS 3 level data for these 
variables from national accounts sources given that these variables are measured differently 
in different countries, gathered using divergent methodologies and categorised on a regional 
level that is not always consistent with the NUTS framework. Given these limitations to the 
available data, a decision was made at the outset to organise two separate datasets, one on a 
NUTS 2 level with all variables drawn from sources aggregated on a NUTS 2 level and one 
on the NUTS 3 level, with the dependent variables, share of manufacturing employment, 
migration and GDP variables drawn from sources aggregated on a NUTS 3 level and the 
remaining three variables being constructed by mapping the NUTS 2 level data onto the 
NUTS 3 regions. This was made possible by the categorisation of all NUTS levels to a 
unique code that expands by an additional digit given the level of disaggregation; with the 
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NUTS 1 regions being categorised by a three-digit code, the NUTS 2 regions being 
categorised by a four-digit code and the NUTS 3 regions being categorised by a five-digit 
code (European Commission, 2011: 139). Therefore, in order to provide data for the variables 
missing in the NUTS 3 database the four digit NUTS 2 codes were matched to the first four 
digits of the five digit NUTS 3 codes, giving a value for each missing variable. While this 
procedure is not ideal it constitutes the only option available given the limitations of the data. 
Two datasets were therefore gathered, both with their respective advantages and 
disadvantages. The NUTS 2 level database is completely consistent for all variables and 
contains a reasonably high number of observations on a European level, but a low number of 
observations for most individual countries. The NUTS 3 level database has the benefit of 
being on a much lower level of aggregation providing a much higher level of heterogeneous 
variation and provides a much higher number of observations on both the European and 
national level. It nevertheless has the disadvantage of being partially composed of 
independent variables on a higher level of aggregation. Finally, limitations on the availability 
of NUTS 3 election data for some countries meant that the dataset covers a smaller, albeit 
more coherent set of countries, namely regional data on Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden. Whereas, the NUTS 2 datasets used for analysis in this paper 
contain regional data on Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Sweden and Finland.  
 
The final issue that informed the overall construction of the datasets is perhaps the most 
obvious, namely: elections. Elections are not annual events and national elections are 
conducted under different electoral systems and take place at non-uniform intervals. 
European Parliament elections have the advantage of taking place at the same time – albeit 
only for member states – and under the same electoral system. Elections to the European 
Parliament take place under proportional representation, freeing citizens to vote for minority 
parties. Furthermore, votes for radical right parties in EU elections, with their opposition to 
economic integration, free movement of labour and the European project can be seen as a 
proxy for opposition to globalisation and support for economic and political nationalism 
(Becker, 2016; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2014). This might be taken as a reason to 
undertake the analysis only on the basis of European Parliament elections. However, there are 
obvious drawbacks to using votes for the European Parliament as the singular measure of 
European voting patterns for social democratic and radical right-wing political parties. The 
European Parliament has a mandate and institutional role distinct from that of national 
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legislatures, it possesses no legislative initiative, nor does it form a European government in a 
manner comparable with national legislatures. The motivation of electors is clearly different 
when voting for the European Parliament than voting at a national level, with voter turnout 
being much lower than average turnout on a national level (Schmitt et al, 2015). This means 
it is not necessarily the most suitable measure of voting patterns. Finally, the majority of the 
related literature uses national legislative election data. Therefore, in order to gain results that 
are comparable with previous research it is preferable to use national election data. 
 
Given the relative advantages and disadvantages of both the national and European election 
data the decision was made to create two different sets of data, both on a NUTS 2 and NUTS 
3 level for national and European elections, with the aim being to cover the same counties in 
both datasets. This therefore excluded non-EU member European states such as Norway and 
Switzerland from the outset. The management of the datasets using European Parliament 
election data as the dependent variable was reasonably straight forward, three European 
Parliament elections have taken place since 2000, namely in 2004, 2009 and 2014. For both 
the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 European Parliament datasets it was therefore necessary only to 
compile the regional values for the variables for the years 2004, 2009 and 2014. For the 
NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 datasets based on national elections this procedure was somewhat more 
complicated. A visualisation of the legislative elections held for the countries used in this 
analysis can be found in Table 1. 
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Table 1. National legislative election years for selected EU countries. Showing variation in the quantity and 
timing of elections between 2000 and 2014. Source: European Election Database. 
 
Table 1 highlights that the number of elections occurring during the period of analysis ranges 
from three to five with significant variation in the year in which they took place. In order to 
construct a coherent dataset, it was therefore necessary to make a judgement about which 
years to include and exclude. Given that Belgium, Finland and France only held three 
elections during this period of analysis it was necessary to limit the years of observation to 
three. The decision over which election years to select for the remaining countries was 
motivated both by a need to maximise the spread of years across the period of analysis and 
also to maximise the amount of crossover of the years selected. Given these two motivating 
factors the final selection of national election years are displayed in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Election years chosen for national analysis. Showing the election years used for the national election 
datasets. Source: European Election Database. 
 
25	
While there are problems with comparing the impact of demographic and economic factors 
on election patterns in different countries between different years this approach is 
unavoidable given the nature of national elections. 
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3.2 Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variable in all models is vote share, defined as the number of votes for one or 
more political parties as a percentage of the total valid votes cast in a given NUTS region. 
This variable was chosen over, for example, seats won in a legislature or membership of a 
political party, as it was deemed to provide the most accurate measure of political expression 
of a populace in a given locale. Social democratic parties were defined by their participation 
in the Party of European Socialists (PES), which organises practically all social democratic 
parties on a European level. This procedure was reasonably straight forward as almost all 
countries chosen for analysis contain one monolithic social democratic party, in countries 
where two social democratic parties exist due to ethno-linguistic divisions, such as in 
Belgium, the vote share of these two parties was combined.  
 
The definition of which political parties constitute what this paper refers to as ‘radical right’ 
was somewhat more complicated. The literature contains extensive discussion and 
disagreement over the precise definition of such parties; varyingly distinguishing between 
‘far right’, ‘right-wing populist’ and ‘radical right’ ideologies and organisations (Stockhemer, 
2017). To further complicate matters parties of the far and extreme right do not have a 
singular consistent European party or party group in the manner of the European social 
democrat, liberal and Christian democrat parties, rather several different European level 
political parties and groups exist. Arriving at an ideal definition of what is and is not a radical 
right party constitutes an interminable task, but for the purposes of this research such a 
definition is unnecessary, as Mudde (1996: 233) puts it, “we know who they are, even though 
we do not know exactly what they are”. This paper therefore uses the catchall term ‘radical 
right’, defined broadly as parties that support nationalism – generally of an ethnic or monistic 
flavour – along with hard Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration, social conservatism and 
populism. With the highly contested term ‘populism’ being understood, following Mudde 
(1996: 544) as a “thin-centred ideology” focusing on an antagonism between “the people” 
and “elites” against a backdrop of popular sovereignty. This categorisation incorporates 
parties from a range of European political parties and groups including the Europe of Nations 
and Freedom (ENF), Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), Alliance of European National 
Movements (AENM) and the Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe (ADDE), as well as 
members of none of these organisations. One might object to this broad definition, in that it 
groups together both anti-Semitic extremist nationalist parties with their origins in inter-war 
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fascism, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), with the comparatively 
moderate right-wing populist and Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany (AfD) and political 
parties that support the welfare state and government intervention in the economy such as the 
French National Front with political parties that support fiscal conservativism and laissez-
faire such as the French National Republican Movement. Nevertheless, despite these 
differences in policy and origins these political parties share a common set of political 
perspectives and characteristics in their operation as parties that clearly distinguish them from 
conventional conservatism. Support for these parties amongst the electorate is indicative of 
support for economic and political nationalism, opposition to immigration and the EU and an 
antagonism toward ‘elites’. Furthermore, this broad categorisation of radical right parties 
corresponds closely with the approach undertaken in the most closely related studies in the 
literature (Arzheimer, 2008; Oeusch, 2008; Rydgren 2008; Stockhemer, 2017; Halla et al, 
2017). Despite certain overlapping policies with the parties of the radical right Christian 
fundamentalist parties such as the Dutch Reformed Political Party were excluded from this 
definition. Similarly, conservative nationalist parties seeking regional independence or 
autonomy but supporting immigration and the European project such as the Bavaria Party 
were also excluded.  
 
In order to produce broadly comparable datasets, the decision was made from the outset to 
exclude countries that, due to historical and political factors, do not contain any sizable 
radical right party. This means that Ireland, Spain and Portugal were not included. While the 
lack of any meaningful electoral support for the radical right is of course a result in itself, 
inclusion of these countries would have biased the overall European analyses. Very small 
countries that constitute only one NUTS 2 level region such as Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were also excluded, as it was not possible to analyse regional 
variation at a NUTS 2 level. In order to produce consistent datasets for the years of the 
European Parliament elections countries that joined the EU after 2004, namely Romania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia, were also excluded from analysis. French overseas departments, 
namely French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte and Réunion were also excluded as 
these departments of France are not located in geographical Europe and are distinct in their 
economic development, history, ethnic composition and politics. Similarly, the French 
department of Corsica was excluded from analysis, this is because the politics of this region 
are dominated by the Corsican independence movement with the largest political party being 
Pè a Corsica, which is itself a permanent electoral alliance of the moderate autonomist Femu 
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a Corsica and the more left-wing pro-independence party Corsica Libera (De la Calle & Fazi, 
2010). Both the French Socialist Party and the National Front compete in the Corsican 
elections but fare badly in a manner atypical of the rest of France. In order to prevent any bias 
arising from this outlier, Corsica was dropped from the analysis. While some countries gather 
data on overseas voters, this data was also excluded from analysis. 
 
The primary source of all election data was the European Election and Referendum Database 
(EED). The quality and consistency of the data contained in this database further informed 
the choice of countries used for analysis. The United Kingdom runs elections on a 
constituency basis and does not collect this data on a national level. These constituencies do 
not correspond to NUTS regions nor is micro data available that can be accurately aggregated 
onto the NUTS regions. Similarly, Italian electoral data and Polish electoral data is not 
consistently gathered on a NUTS level. For this reason, these countries were excluded from 
analysis. This is unfortunate as these omissions exclude the falling vote share of the British 
Labour Party, and the rise of the British National Party (BNP) and United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, along with voting patterns for Lega Nord and various 
minor neo-fascist parties in Italy. It does however avoid various categorisation problems 
present in Polish electoral data. Poland is a clear outlier on a European level in that it 
presently has two social democratic parties; Labour United, a minor political party, and the 
larger and more successful Democratic Left Alliance, with additional now defunct social 
democratic parties that emerged from splits and mergers with these two parties. These parties 
emerged out of the historical communist party and have declined sharply since the 1990s 
winning no seats at all in the most recent election. Furthermore, the ascendant political force 
in recent years in Poland, the Law and Justice Party, is difficult to clearly categorise based on 
the definitions used in this paper, having shifted from a conventional European 
conservative/Christian democrat party to a more right-wing populist, anti-immigrant and 
Eurosceptic party since the mid-2000s in a manner somewhat similar to that of Fidesz in 
Hungary (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016).  
 
While the EED database is reasonably consistent between 1990 and 2009 it is much less so 
after this point, the 2014 European Parliament election data is missing for all states and 
national election data after 2009 is inconsistent. Nevertheless, the EED provides links to the 
data sources used in various national account and other official sources. Therefore, recent 
missing election data could be reconstructed in the majority of cases from these sources. This 
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was not, however, possible for either Greece or Hungary, both of which only provide election 
data in their national databases on a constituency level, these regions are not compatible with 
the NUTS regions and attempts to gain crosswalks from the national statistics offices of these 
countries were not successful. This is again unfortunate as the electoral demise of the Greek 
social democratic party PASOK and Hungarian social democratic party the Hungarian 
Socialist Party were therefore omitted, along with the rise of Popular Orthodox Rally and 
Golden Dawn in Greece and JOBBIK in Hungary, all parties of the radical nationalist right 
(Oesch, 2008; Stockhemer, 2017; Enyedi, 2015). Preliminary regression analysis found that 
the Slovakian data could not be subject to analysis owing to a high level of multicollinearity 
in the data, therefore this country was omitted. Nonetheless, the decision was made to include 
Czech Republic in the datasets in spite of the fact that this country potentially constitute an 
outlier given that it is a post-communist state that has accessed to the EU relatively recently. 
The reason for this decision was that Czech Republic is reasonably economically developed 
and, furthermore, possesses a political culture closer to that of Central Europe than Eastern 
Europe. 
 
Gathering missing electoral data on a NUTS 2 level was straight forward for some countries; 
being readily available through national statistics and election offices for Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Czech Republic. However, of these countries NUTS 3 level data was 
only readily available for Sweden and Finland. Missing election data on both a NUTS 2 and 
NUTS 3 level was collected for Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands using 
microdata of votes cast on the smallest municipal unit, with these datasets being retrieved 
either from published datasets on the national statistics websites or through private data 
retrieval requests made to these bodies. These municipalities were aggregated to a NUTS 3 
and NUTS 2 level using crosswalk provided by their respective statistics offices. This was 
done by combining both the votes cast for the political parties of interest and the total valid 
votes for all municipalities within each NUTS region and calculating the vote share, in a 
manner consistent with the approach taken by the EED methodology. In keeping with the 
methodological approach employed by the EED, only results from the first round of 
legislative elections were used for France, whereas for Germany only results for the second 
vote (Zweistimmen) were included. The Åland Islands constitute an autonomous region of 
Finland with its own parliament and political parties, being represented also in the Finnish 
parliament through a cross-party coalition. Electoral results for Åland were therefore taken 
from the Parliament of Åland elections with the Åland Social Democrats, itself a member of 
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the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement (SAMAK) which is 
affiliated with PES, used for the social democratic vote share and the radical right populist 
Ålandic Democracy party being used for the radical right vote. The political parties used in 
analysis for all countries in both the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 datasets are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Social democratic and radical right political parties. Showing the political parties for all countries 
of analysis in both the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 datasets. 
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Figures 4 and 5 display the national aggregates vote share of social democratic and radical 
right parties in the European Parliament elections for the countries under analysis.  
 
 
Figure 4. Social Democratic Vote Share, EU Parliament – Selected Countries. Showing the number of votes 
for social democratic parties as a percentage of valid votes cast for countries analysed in this paper. Source: 
European Election Database and national statistics offices. 
 
 
Figure 5. Radical Right Vote Share, EU Parliament – Selected Countries. Showing the number of votes for 
radical right parties as a percentage of valid votes cast for countries analysed in this paper. Source: European 
Election Database and national statistics offices. 
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While the electoral patterns of the majority of the sample follow the broad political trends 
identified in Chapter 1 there is clear heterogeneity within the sample. The social democratic 
vote in the 2014 European parliament election in Germany grew considerably, while in 
Sweden the overall decline in the social democratic vote has been minimal. Similarly, the 
radical right vote in Belgium has declined precipitously in each European parliament 
election, brought about by the displacement of Vlams Belang by the moderate civic 
nationalist New Flemish Alliance (Beyens et al, 2010). While the electoral patterns in Czech 
following an overall more erratic pattern. This within-sample heterogeneity should not be 
considered problematic. The data used in this study is on the regional level not the national 
level and the inclusion of a year fixed effect should control for this heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, the exclusion from the sample of countries that do not follow the overall trends 
outlined in Chapter 1 could lead to spurious results. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 display the national aggregate vote share for social democratic and radical 
right parties for the national elections chosen for analysis. With the first array of national 
election years displayed as ‘Election 1’, the second array as ‘Election 2’ and the third array as 
‘Election 3’. 
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Figure 6. Social Democratic Vote Share, EU Parliament – Selected Countries. Showing the number of votes 
for social democratic parties as a percentage of valid votes cast for countries analysed in this paper. Source: 
European Election Database and national statistics offices. 
 
 
Figure 7. Radical Right Vote Share, National Elections – Selected Countries. Showing the number of votes 
for radical right parties as a percentage of valid votes cast for countries analysed in this paper. Source: European 
Election Database and national statistics offices. 
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While the majority of the sample countries follow the overall European trends identified in 
this paper there is also within sample heterogeneity. The social democratic vote rose in 
France and the Netherlands during the selected election years, though it has since fallen 
considerably. Similarly, the radical right vote share fell in Election 3 for Belgium and 
Denmark and in Election 2 for France and the Netherlands. Again, this should not be 
considered a major problem – regional data is used and the inclusion of a year fixed effect 
should control for this heterogeneity. 
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3.3 Independent Variables 
 
The following section provides a detailed explanation of the data management of the six 
independent variables. 
 
Share of manufacturing employment: 
 
The data for this variable was derived from the Cambridge Econometrics European Regional 
Database (ERD). Share of manufacturing employment is defined as the number of people 
employed in manufacturing as a percentage of total employed people in a given NUTS 
region, with employment defined as all persons engaged in some productive activity, whether 
employed by others or self-employed (McQuinn, 2016). The share of total employment was 
chosen over share of active population as the ERD active employment variable is allocated to 
the region in which people live rather than work, whereas the manufacturing and total 
employment data is allocated to the region in which people work. This active employment 
data therefore does not take into account the commuting effect and could therefore give 
misleading results (McQuinn, 2016). While the ERD database defines the employment data 
as “industry excluding construction”, this data is derived from the Eurostat regional 
employment data that is labelled “manufacturing” and the two terms can therefore be treated 
as synonymous and this paper, for the sake of clarity has chosen to use the term 
“manufacturing” exclusively. This data is completely consistent and was available on both 
NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 levels.  
 
The aggregate data for both the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 countries is displayed in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Manufacturing Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment – Selected Countries. 
Showing aggregate manufacturing employment for the countries included in both the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 
datasets. Source: Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database. 
 
Manufacturing employment in the sample countries for both the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 
datasets therefore follows closely the overall European trend identified in Chapter 2.2. 
 
Unemployment rate: 
 
The data for this variable was derived from the Eurostat lfst_r_lfu3rt database, which 
provides harmonised regional EU unemployment data from 2000 to 2015. The 
unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed persons between the ages of 15 
and 74 as a percentage of the labour force. EU unemployment data is currently only 
consistently available on a NUTS 2 level. Therefore, this data was mapped onto the NUTS 3 
regions in the NUTS 3 datasets in the manner outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
However, the Eurostat dataset contains some missing values; the Finnish regional 
unemployment rate was missing for the years prior to 2005 and the Danish regional 
unemployment rate was missing prior to 2007. The missing values for both countries were 
however available from their respective national accounts databases. The French 
unemployment rate for the NUTS 2 region of Limousin and the NUTS 3 sub regions of 
Corrèze, Creuse and Haute-Vienne were found to be missing for the year 2004, while the data 
for all previous and subsequent years was present. This data was not available from the 
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French national accounts database and was therefore interpolated through a simple linear 
interpolation. 
 
Crude rate of net migration: 
 
This variable was derived from the Eurostat demo_r_gind3 database. Net migration is defined 
as the difference between immigration to and emigration from a given area during a year. The 
crude rate of net migration is the ratio of net migration during the year to the average 
population in that year, as expressed per thousand inhabitants. The majority of EU states 
either do not have accurate and consistent regional immigration and emigration data or, in 
some instances, no data at all. The data that is available cannot be adequately harmonised to 
produce a consistent dataset. Eurostat therefore estimates this figure as the difference 
between total population change and the natural population increase in a given year. While 
the figures produced do not separate immigration and emigration flows, the figure does 
provide an indication of immigration flows, in that the value is positive when there are more 
immigrants than emigrants and negative when there are more emigrants than immigrants.  
 
This variable cannot, however, be considered a substitute for immigration data; it is at best a 
proxy and care should be taken when interpreting any findings derived from it. Given that the 
question of immigration is of great importance when considering electoral patterns for radical 
right and social democratic parties it was nonetheless imperative to include a proxy of this 
variable. The crude rate of net migration was chosen over simply net migration as the former 
provides a measure of the proportion of net migration to the average population, which was 
deemed to be a better approximate measure of immigration. Data was, however, also 
gathered for net migration and this variable was used in all preliminary panel regressions 
without significantly different results. Given these preliminary findings and the precedent set 
by previous literature, the crude rate of net migration was, therefore, used in all final 
specifications. This data was available on both a NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level. The data was 
missing for Denmark prior to 2007, the available data was found to follow no clear pattern or 
trend and could not be forecast with either a linear or polynomial. It was however found that 
a correlation in regional behaviour existed with total population, therefore the national data 
was rescaled for each region based on the regional share of national population. This was 
only done on the NUTS 2 level as Denmark is excluded from the NUTS 3 dataset for the 
reasons described in the previous section.   
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GDP: 
 
The data for this variable was derived from the Eurostat nama_10r_2gdp and nama_10r_2gdp 
databases, which provide consistent harmonised European GDP data on both a NUTS 2 and 
NUTS 3 level. The unit of measurement is purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant. 
An alternative measure for GDP was derived from the EED database, this data is defined as 
Total Gross Value Added plus taxes less subsidies on products, in billions of Euro in 2005 
prices. There are potential advantages and disadvantages to each measurement of GDP; the 
EED GDP data may provide a better control for EU business cycles, while the PPS per 
inhabitant measure may better highlight variation. However, PPS per inhabitant was chosen 
because it was deemed preferable to use a per inhabitant measure that better controls for EU 
variation. All final specifications were rerun with the GDP variable derived from the EED 
and it was found to not significantly alter the results. As GDP rises exponentially the 
logarithmic form of GDP was used in all models. 
 
Age: 
 
The data for this variable was derived from the Eurostat demo_r_pjangroup database. It is 
defined as the number of people aged 45 years and over in a given region as a percentage of 
the total population. This data is only available on a NUTS 2 level and was, therefore, 
mapped onto the NUTS 3 regions in the manner previously described. The NUTS 2 data was 
found to be missing for Denmark prior to 2007; however, the available regional data and 
national aggregates were found to follow a clear linear trend so it was therefore extrapolated 
backwards using a simple linear forecast model. 
 
Education: 
 
The data for this variable was derived from the Eurostat edat_lfse_04 database. It is defined 
as the percentage of the population in a given region aged 25-64 who have completed a full 
level of tertiary education, levels 5-8. These levels are equivalent to university education 
from a Bachelors to a PhD level. As this data is only available on a NUTS 2 level it was 
mapped onto the NUTS 3 regions in the manner previously described. The NUTS 2 data for 
Finland prior to 2005 and Denmark prior to 2007 was missing; however, the data available 
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followed a clear linear trend and was, therefore, extrapolated backwards using a simple linear 
forecast model. 
 
Due to a variety of inconsistencies in the Eurostat data for Germany, caused by changes in 
the boundaries of the NUTS regions several regions of Germany were dropped from analysis. 
On the NUTS 2 level the regions of Chemnitz and Leipzig were missing from the migration 
data prior to 2009 and from the unemployment, age and education data prior to 2005. This 
data could not be retrieved from German national accounts and the available data points were 
deemed insufficient to extrapolate the missing results. Therefore, these two regions were 
dropped from the NUTS 2 datasets. On a NUTS 3 level inconsistencies in the availability of 
data for the sub-regions of Chemnitz Leipzig and surrounding NUTS 2 regions led to all 
regions for the German federal regions (Bundesländer) of Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt to be 
dropped from analysis. Furthermore, inconsistencies in the availability of the Eurostat data 
for the NUTS 3 regions of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern led to all regions within this federal 
region apart from Rostock and Schwerin to be dropped from analysis. Finally, due to 
boundary changes in the NUTS 3 region of Aachen and Aachen Kreis these regions were also 
dropped from both datasets. While these omissions are regrettable it should be understood 
that the datasets nonetheless cover the majority of regions in Germany. The final NUTS 2 
datasets cover 36 of a possible 39 regions, meaning that the final dataset covers 92.31 percent 
of the NUTS 2 regions of Germany. Whereas the final NUTS 3 datasets cover 369 of a 
possible 429 regions, or 86.01 percent. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Using the sources and data management techniques described in the previous sections four 
datasets were produced covering both EU parliament and national parliament election years 
on a NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level. The descriptive statistics for the NUTS 2 datasets can be 
found in Tables 4 and 5 and the descriptive statistics for the NUTS 3 datasets can be found in 
Tables 6 and 7. 
 
 
Table 4. European Parliament Elections – NUTS 2. Showing the descriptive statistics for the NUTS 2 dataset 
covering the 2004, 2008 and 2014 European Parliament elections. Source: European Election Database, 
Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database, Eurostat and national statistics offices. 
 
42	
 
Table 5. National Elections – NUTS 2. Showing the descriptive statistics for the NUTS 2 dataset for three 
national election years for each country in the sample. Source: European Election Database, Cambridge 
Econometrics European Regional Database, Eurostat and national statistics offices. 
 
The NUTS 2 datasets are both strongly balanced, that is they have the same number of 
observations (t) per cross-sectional unit (i). The mean values are broadly similar for all 
independent variables though they vary somewhat more dramatically for the dependent 
variables, with the mean value of radical right parties being 1.25 units lower in the national 
elections dataset (Table 5) and the mean value of social democratic parties being 5.93 units 
lower in the European parliament dataset (Table 4). This corresponds with the minimal and 
maximal values for the datasets. The minimal value for social democratic parties being much 
lower in the European parliament dataset than in the national election dataset and the 
maximum value for radical right parties being much higher in the European parliament 
dataset than in the national election dataset. These differences can be explained by the 
differing institutional role of the European parliament in relation to national parliaments, the 
consistent use of proportional representation in European parliament elections and the 
relatively low turnout for these elections. While electors might be motivated to choose a 
‘lesser evil’ on a national level based on the likelihood of certain parties winning 
representation or forming a government, they may feel freer to vote based purely on political 
conviction in European parliament elections. Finally, European parliament elections may be 
used as a means to express discontent with free movement, economic integration and the 
centralisation of powers on an EU level, through votes for radical right or other minor parties.  
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Table 6. European Parliament Elections – NUTS 3. Showing the descriptive statistics for the NUTS 3 dataset 
covering the 2004, 2008 and 2014 European Parliament elections. Source: European Election Database, 
Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database, Eurostat and national statistics offices. 
 
 
Table 7. National Elections – NUTS 3. Showing the descriptive statistics for the NUTS 3 dataset for three 
national election years for each country in the sample. Source: European Election Database, Cambridge 
Econometrics European Regional Database, Eurostat and national statistics offices. 
 
The NUTS 3 datasets are all strongly balanced, with a much higher number of observations 
than the NUTS 2 datasets. The mean values for the independent variables are similar in both 
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the NUTS 3 datasets, while the dependent variables differ in a manner comparable with the 
NUTS 2 datasets and that can be explained in a similar way. One noticeable difference 
between the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 datasets can be found in the Migration variable. The 
NUTS 3 datasets cover a much higher scale of minimum and maximum values for the crude 
rate of net migration. This can be accounted for by the much higher level of disaggregation in 
the NUTS 3 datasets.  
 
Given that the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 datasets cover different samples of countries and contain 
data on different levels of aggregation, it can be expected that they will produce different 
results on the European level and, quite possibly, different results on the national level as 
well. While it should be possible to compare the results gained on a national level this will 
not be possible on the European level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45	
3.5 Multicollinearity 
 
While it is neither necessary nor feasible to undertake diagnostic testing for panel data 
models of the kind used in this paper it is nonetheless useful to check the variables for 
multicollinearity. It is not possible to calculate the VIF value for each independent variable in 
a fixed effect panel model, therefore multicollinearity is tested through a pairwise correlation 
of all independent variables for each dataset. Following common practice, bivariate 
correlation in excess of 0.5 is thought of as potentially problematic and is marked in green. 
The results of this pairwise correlation for each dataset is shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Pairwise Correlation for Final Datasets, NUTS 2 & NUTS 3. Showing pairwise correlation of all 
variables in the final NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 datasets, with potentially problematic variables marked in green. 
Source: European Election Database, Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database, Eurostat and 
national statistics offices. 
 
While Table 8 suggests no problematic correlation between any variable in either of the 
NUTS 3 datasets it does identify potentially problematic high correlation between the 
Education and Manufacturing, and Education and GDP, variables in the NUTS 2 data sets. 
This correlation is theoretically and intuitively reasonable, given that we would expect a 
negative correlation between high levels of education and manufacturing employment and a 
positive correlation between high levels of education and GDP. The high correlation of these 
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values could be indicative of multicollinearity which could undermine the statistical 
significance of the model’s independent variables and bias the results. Potential remedies for 
multicollinearity include providing an alternative education variable or removing the variable 
altogether. However, robustness tests carried out on the NUTS 2 datasets wherein the 
Education variable was omitted from the model found that its omission did not significantly 
alter either the p-values or coefficients. Therefore, it was concluded that the inclusion of the 
Education variable was not likely to cause multicollinearity problems severe enough to 
significantly bias the results. The results of these robustness checks can be found in Appendix 
A.  
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Chapter 4. Model Specification 
 
4.1 Models 
 
Fixed effect panel data models were chosen to examine the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. Panel data models were chosen as they allow us to 
study heterogeneity explicitly. Fixed effects were employed to exploit within group variation 
over time while controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The assumptions 
behind the random effects model are unlikely to hold given the research aims and variables 
employed in this paper, it was therefore deemed unnecessary to carry out a Hausman test. 
 
Two baseline models were used; one to examine the European country sample as a whole and 
one to examine country by country variation. The first model uses all observations for all 
years, countries and regions for a given dataset and employs a year fixed effect, region fixed 
effect and country by year fixed effect. This model can be expressed as follows: 
 𝑦"#$ = 𝛽' 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔"$ + 𝛽3 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡"$ + 𝛽: 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛"$ + 𝛽; 𝑙𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃"$  + 𝛽? 𝐴𝑔𝑒"$ + 𝛽A 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛"$ +	𝛼" + 𝜆$ 	+	𝜒#$ + 𝜀"#$ 1  
 
where 𝛼" captures the regional fixed effect, 𝜆$ captures the year fixed effect and 𝜒#$ captures 
the country by year fixed effect. 
 
The second model examines each country in turn, using all years and regions for a given 
country in a given dataset. It includes a year and region fixed effect. This model is expressed 
as follows: 
 𝑦"$ = 	𝛽' 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔"$ + 𝛽3 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡"$ + 𝛽: 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛"$ + 𝛽; 𝑙𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃"$  + 𝛽? 𝐴𝑔𝑒"$ + 𝛽A 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛"$ +	𝛼" + 𝜆$ 	+ 𝜀"$ 2  
 
where 𝛼" captures the regional fixed effect and 𝜆$ captures the year fixed effect. 
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These two models were then employed for each of the four datasets, namely the European 
Parliament election NUTS 2 dataset, the national election NUTS 2 dataset, the European 
Parliament election NUTS 3 dataset and the national election NUTS 3 dataset, and for each 
of the two dependent variables, namely the social democratic vote share and radical right vote 
share. For reasons outlined in the previous chapter the natural logarithm of GDP is used in all 
final specifications.  
 
It should be emphasised that these models cannot be used to determine causality. Even with 
the application of fixed effects there may be time-variant unobserved heterogeneity and the 
models and variables may not be optimally specified given the limitations on the data. The 
best that these models can hope to achieve is the identification of robust statistically 
significant association between one or more of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. Interpreted in context, and in light of theory and previous research, this association 
may be taken as evidence of a practical significance. The results derived from the use of these 
two models are presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5. Empirical Testing 
 
5.1 Results European Elections NUTS 2 
 
This chapter presents the regression results using the two fixed effect models for each of the 
datasets, on both a European and national level. For reasons discussed in this, and subsequent 
sections of this chapter, only the findings derived from the NUTS 3 datasets are used as the 
basis of the discussion and conclusion. Therefore, those interested only in the final results are 
advised to move to the NUTS 3 sections of this chapter. It should be noted that while the 
within panel r-squared has been provided for each regression this cannot be interpreted in the 
conventional manner. The addition of fixed effects to a panel data model typically produces 
inflated r-squared values; this occurs because the fixed effects absorb a lot variation by 
adding additional independent variables. This is not therefore indicative of a problem with 
the models used.  
 
For the sake of space, given the large number of tables presented, the coefficients for the 
fixed effects are not displayed. However, it should be noted that the year fixed effects 
consistently show average changes in social democratic and radical right votes for individual 
countries and election years that correspond with the data visualisations presented in Figure 4 
through 7. The average change in the year fixed effects vary for the European full panel 
regressions, determined by the different country and year samples used in each dataset. The 
overall change in vote share for the different political parties as signified by the fixed effect 
shall therefore be mentioned only following each European full panel regression. The results 
for the regressions with social democratic and radical right vote share as the dependent 
variable are presented side by side for the European full panel regressions, while the country 
level regressions are presented in two tables, one showing the regression results with social 
democratic vote share as the dependent variable and one showing the regression results with 
radical right vote share as the dependent variable. The country level panels display the results 
for each country in order of the number of observations ranging from highest to lowest 
displayed from left to right. 
 
It should be recalled that only the GDP variable is in logarithmic form. Therefore, the 
average change in the dependent variable brought about by a one unit change in a statistically 
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and practically significant independent variable, should be calculated based on the exponent 
of the coefficient, this can be expressed as: 
 ∆𝑦	 = 	𝛽'∆𝑥 
 
Whereas the average change in the dependent variable brought about by a one percent change 
in a statistically and practically significant GDP (log) variable, should be calculated by 
dividing the exponent of the coefficient by 100, this can be expressed as: 
 ∆𝑦	 = 	 𝛽'100 %∆𝑥 
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Table 9 shows the regression output of the full European panel for the NUTS 2 European 
parliament elections dataset. The year fixed effects show an average decrease in the vote 
share for social democratic parties and an average increase in the vote share for radical right 
parties. Only one variable appears statistically significant for each regression, with migration 
appearing statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the social democratic vote 
regression and GDP appearing statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the radical 
right vote regression. This therefore indicates that a one unit change in the crude rate of net 
migration, i.e. when immigration exceeds emigration, is associated with a 0.250 percent 
decrease in the social democratic vote share. Whereas a one percent increase in GDP leads to 
a 0.134 decrease in votes for radical right parties. It should be noted that the robust standard 
errors for the GDP variable appear somewhat inflated, this could be an indication of 
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multicollinearity or simply that the GDP coefficient is imprecisely estimated. This feature is 
apparent in all estimates of the GDP variable in the NUTS 2 results. 
 
 
 
Table 10 shows the country level results for the NUTS 2 European parliament election 
dataset with social democratic vote share as the dependent variable. Following convention, 
country level regressions with less than 30 observations are not discussed. Of the countries 
available for interpretation only Belgium shows statistically significant variables, with 
unemployment appearing statistically significant at the 1 percent level and manufacturing and 
migration appearing statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients suggest 
that a one unit change in the unemployment rate is associated with an average 1.140 percent 
increase in the social democratic vote share, while a one unit decrease in manufacturing is 
associated with an average 1.500 percent increase in vote share and a one unit increase in 
migration is associated with an average 0.486 decrease in vote share. While these findings 
appear plausible the very low number of observations should make one hesitant about 
drawing any strong conclusions.  
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Table 11 shows the country level results of the NUTS 2 European parliament elections 
dataset with radical right vote share as the dependent variable. Of the countries available for 
analysis only the Netherlands shows statistically significant results at the 5 percent level or 
higher, with a one unit change in the age variable, equivalent to a one unit increase in the 
percentage of the population aged 45 or over, being associated with an average 2.803 percent 
increase in the radical right vote share. Again, this finding appears feasible; however, the 
number of observations for this country is low.  
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5.2 Results National Elections NUTS 2 
 
 
 
Table 12 shows the regression output for the full European panel for the NUTS 2 national 
elections dataset. The year fixed effects show an average decrease in the vote share for both 
social democratic and radical right parties. No variables appear statistically significant on a 
European level for the radical right results, whereas only unemployment appears statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for the social democratic results. With the coefficient 
suggesting that a one unit increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.960 
percent increase in the vote share of the social democratic parties.  
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Table 13 shows the country level results for the NUTS 2 national election dataset with the 
social democratic vote share as the dependent variable. Of the countries available for analysis 
only Germany and Belgium show statistically significant results above a 5 percent 
significance level. Education appears statistically significant at the 1 percent level and 
unemployment appears statistically significant at the 5 percent level for Germany, with a one 
unit increase in the share of people with a university level education being associated with a 
0.710 average increase in the vote share and a one unit increase in unemployment being 
associated with a 0.922 percent increase in vote share. The country level regression for 
Belgium suggests that a one unit decrease in manufacturing employment leads to an average 
1.489 percent decrease in the social democratic vote share. While these findings are again 
feasible, the number of observations for Belgium is very low.  
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Table 14 shows the country level results of the NUTS 2 national elections dataset with the 
radical right vote share as the dependent variable. Once again, of the countries available for 
analysis only Germany and Belgium show statistically significant results. With GDP 
appearing statistically significant at the 5 percent level for Germany and manufacturing 
appearing statistically significant at the 1 percent level for Belgium. The coefficients suggest 
that a one percent increase in GDP is associated with an average 0.068 fall in the vote share 
for radical right parties in Germany and that a one unit decrease in manufacturing 
employment is associated with an average 4.619 percent decrease in the vote share for radical 
right parties in Belgium. While these results are not unfeasible the number of observations for 
Belgium is very low and the change in vote share brought about by GDP in Germany is in 
practical terms very small. 
 
Taken together the NUTS 2 level results provide a set of theoretically plausible findings. 
However, these results vary considerably between European parliament and national 
legislative elections. On a European level, the results suggest that an increase in net migration 
is positively associated with an increase in the vote share for social democratic parties in 
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European parliament elections and that an increase in unemployment is positively associated 
with a small increase in the vote share for social democratic parties in national elections. 
While for radical right parties, an increase in GDP is associated with a small increase in the 
vote share in European parliament elections. It suggests that for Germany both increases in 
the percentage of the population with a university level education and increases in 
unemployment are associated with a rise in the vote share for the SPD, while a one percent 
increase in GDP is associated with a very small fall in the radical right vote in national 
elections. For Belgium, it suggests that a one unit decrease in the share of manufacturing 
employment is associated with an approximate 1.5 percent decrease in the vote share of 
social democratic parties in both European parliament elections and national elections. While 
a decrease in manufacturing is associated with a near 5 percent decrease in the vote share for 
the radical right. This again appears plausible given that political party support amongst 
Belgian manufacturing workers may be divided between two or more parties. Finally, the 
share of the population over 45 years old appears to be statistically associated with votes for 
radical right parties in the Netherlands, suggesting that the youth vote goes more toward other 
parties on the political spectrum. However, while the number of observations for Germany is 
acceptable the number of observations for the Netherlands and Belgium is very low. Given 
this, solid conclusions cannot be built on these results. Therefore, both the discussion and the 
conclusions shall be built on the findings from the NUTS 3 regressions. These can be found 
in the following two sections of this chapter. 
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5.3 Results European Elections NUTS 3 
 
 
 
Table 15 shows the regression results for the full European panel for the NUTS 3 European 
elections dataset. The year fixed effects show an average decrease in the vote share for the 
social democratic parties and an average increase in the vote share for radical right parties. 
While no independent variables appear statistically significant at the 5 percent or higher level 
for the European social democratic vote, two variables appear statistically significant for the 
radical right vote, namely unemployment at a 1 percent level and GDP at a 5 percent level. 
The coefficients suggest that a one unit increase in unemployment is associated with a 0.170 
decrease in the radical right vote share and a 1 percent increase in GDP is associated with a 
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0.025 decrease in the radical right vote share. In practical terms, this change brought about by 
GDP is small. 
 
 
 
Table 16 shows the country level results for the NUTS 3 European parliament election 
dataset with the social democratic vote share as the dependent variable. However, no 
independent variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or higher. 
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Table 17 shows the country level results for the NUTS 3 European parliament election 
dataset with the radical right vote share as the dependent variable. For Germany, 
unemployment and age are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, with a one unit 
increase in the unemployment rate being associated with an average 0.380 percent decrease 
in the vote share for radical right parties and a one unit increase in the share of the population 
over 45 years being associated with a 0.442 percent fall in the vote share for radical right 
parties. The percentage of the population with a university education appears statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, with a one unit increase being associated with a 0.067 
percent drop in the radical right vote share. For France, both GDP and age appear statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, with a one percent increase being associated with an 
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average 0.148 percent drop in the vote share of radical right parties and a one unit change in 
the percentage of the population over 45 being associated with an average 1.414 percent 
increase in the vote share. It should be noted however that the GDP robust standard errors are 
rather inflated, which could be a sign that the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. For 
Finland, education is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and manufacturing at the 5 
percent level, with a one unit increase in education being associated with an average 1.556 
percent increase in the vote share for the radical right and a one unit decrease in the share of 
manufacturing employment being associated with an average 1.02 percent increase in vote 
share for the radical right. For Sweden, manufacturing employment and net migration are 
both statistically significant at the 5 percent level, with a one unit decrease in manufacturing 
employment being associated with a 0.466 increase in the radical right vote share and a one 
unit increase in net migration being associated with a 0.188 increase in the vote share of the 
radical right. For the Netherlands, age appears statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
with a one unit increase in the share of the population over 45 years leading to a 1.412 
percent increase in the vote share of the radical right. 
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5.4 Results National Elections NUTS 3 
 
 
 
Table 18 shows the regression results for the NUTS 3 national elections dataset. The year 
fixed effects show an average increase in the social democratic vote share in the early 2000s 
followed by a decrease and an average decrease in the radical right vote share in the early 
2000s followed by an increase in the late 2000s. Manufacturing, unemployment and 
education are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level and positively associated with 
the social democratic vote share. While migration is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level and negatively associated with the social democratic vote share. For the radical right 
vote share, unemployment is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the social 
democratic vote share, a one unit decrease in manufacturing employment is associated with a 
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0.262 percent fall in the vote share, while a one unit increase the unemployment rate is 
associated with a 1.149 increase and a one unit increase in the percentage of the population 
with a university degree is associated with a 0.546 increase. A one unit increase in net 
migration is associated with a 0.041 decrease in the social democratic vote share. For the 
radical right vote, a one unit increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.258 
percent decrease in the vote share. 
 
 
 
Table 19 shows the country level results for the NUTS 3 national election dataset with the 
social democratic vote share as the dependent variable. Statistically significant variables 
above the 5 percent significance level are apparent for Germany and Austria. Manufacturing, 
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unemployment and education are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level and 
migration is significant at the 5 percent level for Germany. Whereas, for Austria, age is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level and manufacturing, unemployment and 
education are all statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For Germany, a one unit 
decrease in the share of manufacturing employment is associated with a 0.251 percent 
decrease in the vote share of the SPD, while a one unit increase in the unemployment rate is 
associated with a 1.269 percent increase in the vote, and a one unit increase in the percentage 
of the population with a university education is associated with a 0.759 percent increase in 
the vote share. Finally, a one unit increase in net migration is weakly associated with 0.055 
decrease in the German social democratic vote share. For Austria, a one unit increase in the 
share of the population over 45 years is associated with a 1.617 percent increase in the vote 
share of the SPÖ. While a one unit decrease in manufacturing employment is associated with 
a 0.671 percent decrease in the vote share of the SPÖ, a one unit increase in unemployment is 
associated with a 1.356 percent increase in the vote share and a one unit increase in the share 
of the population with a university education is associated with a 1.081 percent increase. 
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Table 20 shows the country level results for the NUTS 3 national election dataset with the 
radical right vote share as the dependent variable. For Germany, unemployment is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, with a one unit increase in the unemployment 
rate being associated with a 0.332 percent fall in the vote share of the radical right. For the 
Netherlands, age is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, with a one unit increase in 
the share of the population over 45 being associated with a 1.079 percent increase in the vote 
share of the radical right. Migration appears statistically significant only for France, where it 
is significant only at the 5 percent level, with a one unit increase in net migration being 
associated with an average increase in the radical right vote of 0.206 percent. The share of 
manufacturing employment appears statistically significant for both Sweden and Finland, in 
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both instances at 5 percent level, with a one unit decrease in manufacturing employment 
being associated with a 0.858 percent increase in the vote share for radical right parties in 
Sweden, and a one unit decrease in manufacturing employment being associated with a 1.058 
percent increase in the vote share of the radical right in Finland. Unemployment appears 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for Austria, with a one unit increase in the 
unemployment rate being associated with a 1.732 percent decrease in the vote share for the 
FPÖ. 
 
A full range of robustness checks were carried out on the results and it was concluded that the 
results are robust and can be subject to interpretation. The results of these robustness checks 
can be found in Appendix B. The interpretation and analysis of the NUTS 3 level regressions 
shall be presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.1 Discussion 
 
Motivated by a gap in the current literature and recent theory on the causes and effects of 
declining manufacturing employment this paper hypothesised that manufacturing 
employment might be an important determining factor in the changing vote share of both 
social democratic and radical right parties. Evidence for the significance of this factor was 
not however found in the majority of the countries analysed. Only for Germany was a 
strongly statistically significant negative relationship between declining manufacturing 
employment and the vote share for social democratic parties discovered, and here only in the 
dataset covering national elections. This finding, that a one unit decrease in German 
manufacturing employment is statistically associated with a 0.251 percent decrease in the 
vote share of the SPD appears entirely plausible on a theoretical level. Germany retains the 
highest manufacturing employment in the EU-15, at around 19 percent of total employment, 
albeit one that has declined precipitously over the last decades, having fallen around 14 
percentage points since 1980*. Furthermore, it maintains one of the highest private sector 
union densities in Europe, with IG Metall, the trade union covering German manufacturing 
workers, being the largest industrial union in Europe, with close ties to the German SPD 
(Ibsen & Tapia, 2017). A decline in manufacturing employment, brought about by 
technological change and trade liberalisation can therefore be hypothesised to reduce the 
share of traditional core SPD voters by severing their ties with the labour movement and its 
institutions. A corresponding negative relationship between manufacturing employment 
decline and the social democratic vote share was found for Austria, in the national election 
dataset, albeit at a lower level of statistical significance. This again appears plausible, given 
that Austria has one of the highest shares of manufacturing employment in Europe, at around 
16 percent of total employment and a similar institutional context.  
 
While these findings could be attributed to rising regional unemployment or wage 
polarisation brought about by the shedding of manufacturing jobs, no corresponding evidence 
could be found to support this interpretation. No negative association between rising 
																																																						
*	Calculations based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database. 
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unemployment and the social democratic vote share could be found for either Germany or 
Austria. Rather the exact opposite; with rising unemployment being statistically associated 
with a rise in the social democratic vote share in both Germany and Austria in the national 
election datasets. However, no evidence of a corresponding positive relationship between 
manufacturing decline and the rise of the German and Austrian radical right could be found; a 
finding that contradicts expectations made based upon the findings of Dippel (2016; 2017). 
Similarly, no positive relationship between rising unemployment and the vote share of the 
radical right could be found for these countries. In fact, a strong statistical relationship 
between a rising unemployment rate and a decrease in the vote share of radical right parties 
was found for Germany in both datasets and a similar, and statistically weaker negative 
relationship was found for Austria in the national election dataset. A positive relationship 
between declining manufacturing employment and the rise of the radical right was however 
found for Finland and Sweden. Though these findings are at a lower 5 percent level of 
significance, closely corresponding findings, with similar coefficients appear in both the 
European parliament and national election results. These findings could be attributed to either 
wage polarisation, the emergence of a non-routine cognitive workforce or estrangement from 
the trade union movement.  
 
While the influence of these factors on electoral performance are small, at around 0.25-1.5 
percent. They are far from negligible when considering the shifting vote share of political 
parties over time. In fact, these levels of influence correspond closely with the levels of 
variables attributed practical significance by other researchers, using similar data 
(Stockhemer, 2017; Halla et al, 2017). The relatively small influence of these factors does, 
however, highlight that a fixed effect model using economic and demographic data is unable 
to control for the high level of time-variant unobserved heterogeneity that influenced voting. 
To take one illustrative anecdote to highlights this issue; in the 2002 legislative election in the 
Netherlands, the Pim Fortyn List (a hastily assembled electoral list of anti-immigrant right-
wing populists) surprised commentators by winning 17 percent of the popular vote, a first for 
a party of this kind in the Netherlands. This boost in electoral support was widely attributed 
to the politically motivated assassination of the electoral alliance’s leader Pim Fortyn mere 
days before the election (Hoggett, 2015: 57). Yet this success did not transfer to sustained 
support for radical right politics in the 2006 Dutch election where the better organised and 
financed Party for Freedom (widely seen as a successor to the Pim Fortyn List) achieved only 
5.89 percent in the election. In this case, it seems, a bullet did more to bring the electors to 
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the ballot box than how they earn their money or the colour of their neighbour. Therefore, 
while economic and demographic factors undoubtedly affect voting patterns, a wide array of 
other factors that cannot be accurately accounted for play a significant role; ranging from the 
competency and popularity of leaders and local candidates to party finances, and from 
corruption scandals to the weather at a local polling station (Alvarez et al, 2000).  
 
Variation in the findings is also apparent in the differences between the results for the 
European parliament elections and the national elections. While certain findings appear 
robust across the datasets, such as the negative influence of an increase in the unemployment 
rate on the radical right vote share in Germany, the influence of manufacturing employment 
on the radical right vote share in Finland and Sweden and the influence of age on the radical 
right vote share in the Netherlands, other factors perform differently. Looking at Europe as a 
whole, the results of the full panel regressions for the European parliament in Table 15, and 
national election datasets in Table 18, the findings are largely distinct, with the only common 
feature being a strongly statistically significant negative influence of unemployment on the 
radical right vote share, though it should be noted here that this finding is similar to that of 
Stockhemer (2017). This variation can be explained both by the different motivations of 
voters when voting in national and European elections and to the different sample years. EU 
countries vary significantly in terms of economic, demographic, historical, political, 
institutional and cultural factors, not to mention the nature of their radical right parties. This 
time variant unobserved heterogeneity cannot be adequately controlled for using fixed 
effects. This suggests that undertaking analysis on a European level using country and time 
fixed effects is not the most optimal way in which to analyse the influence of economic and 
demographic factors on electoral patterns. Carrying out single or multiple country studies, on 
the lowest level of aggregation with country specific variables to try to capture these factors 
appears the best avenue for future research. 
 
Moving away from the issue of manufacturing to the broader hypothesis presented in the 
literature that economic grievances in terms of unemployment play a role in voting patterns; 
one finds evidence of a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the social 
democratic vote share and a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
radical right vote share on both a European level and for Germany and Austria. While no 
statistical significance was found for these factors in other countries. This perhaps suggests 
that, at least for these countries, the welfare state holds more appeal for the jobless than 
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border controls and work permits. Finally, GDP appears strongly statistically significant only 
for France, and only in the EU election results, with a one percentage point increase being 
associated with a 0.148 percent decrease in the radical right vote share. This means that this 
study finds no evidence for the hypothesis that a rising vote share for the radical right is 
driven by economic grievances, as measured by unemployment and GDP. Though it should 
be noted that this study does not specify alternative variables to examine this issue, such as 
within-work precarity or regional income and wealth inequality. 
 
Some evidence for the impact of migration on voting patterns was found, though only at a 5 
percent significance level. Evidence was found for a positive influence of net migration, 
namely when the number of immigrants exceeds the number of emigrants, on the radical right 
vote share in Sweden and in France. While evidence of a negative influence between net 
migration and the social democratic vote share was found for Germany. Some evidence was 
therefore found that mass immigration and free movement is related to the rise of the radical 
right and the decline of social democracy in these countries. It should be noted, however, that 
the crude rate of net migration is only a proxy for immigration and it is possible that this 
proxy does not adequately capture the effects of immigration. More precise measurements for 
immigration would of course be preferable, for example the immigration rate or the percent 
of foreign born residents. However, this data is not available on a regional cross-country level 
in units that are directly comparable. Nevertheless, examination of national statistics data by 
the author does suggest that this data is available on a high level of regional disaggregation 
for some countries, notably the Nordics and France. However, the manner in which the data 
is gathered and the definitions used in the measures appear to vary between countries making 
it difficult to combine them into one dataset or directly compare the results. 
 
The share of the population with a university education appears significant for some countries 
in the study. A strongly statistically significant positive relationship between education and 
the social democratic vote share was found for Germany in the national election results while 
a smaller statistically weaker negative influence between education and the radical right vote 
share in Germany is found in the European election results. While a strongly significant 
positive influence between education and the radical right vote share was found for Finland 
in the European parliament results and a similar, though weaker, positive influence between 
education and the vote share of the radical right was found for Austria in the national election 
results. These findings suggest that there exists strong variation between countries in the 
72	
educational background of voters for the radical right. Though these findings should be 
treated with caution given that the Education variable was gathered on a higher level of 
aggregation.  
 
The share of the population aged over 45 also appears to have an influence on voting patterns 
in some countries in the sample. Though this influence differs between countries. A 
statistically strong positive influence between age and the social democratic vote share 
appears for Austria in the national election results, though elsewhere no influence was found. 
A positive statistically strong influence between age and the radical right vote share was 
found for France in the European election results and for the Netherlands in the national 
election results, whereas a negative influence between age and the radical right vote share 
was found for Germany in the European parliament results. These results suggest that age is 
not a determining factor in most European countries and that the voter profile of radical right 
voters varies around Europe. However, it could be questioned how accurately this variable 
captures the age profiles of voters, particularly because this variable was gathered on a higher 
level of aggregation, meaning that one should be cautious about drawing strong conclusions 
from these findings. 
 
Given the high level of time variant unobserved heterogeneity both within and between 
European countries future researchers are encouraged to dispense with single panel European 
analysis and instead undertake analysis on a country by country basis. This would enable 
researchers to better specify control variables for regional institutional and event based 
heterogeneity and to gather more accurate immigration data. Given that the GDP variable 
appeared statistically significant in for only one country, and given the precedent set by other 
literature which does not include GDP, it would also be advised to omit this variable. 
National accounts generally provide data that can more accurately control for economic 
grievances. Precarity could, where the data allows, be measured by involuntary part time 
work, while wealth and income inequality could be measured through a regional GINI 
coefficient or through the relative share of income between capital and labour (Doran & 
Jordan, 2013; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2013). Country level analysis would, furthermore, 
allow the inclusion of all relevant election years, greatly increasing the number of 
observations. Finally, those wishing to carry out further research on the impact of 
manufacturing employment on electoral patterns may find that this impact can be better 
explored through constructing a measure of both exposure to automation and trade shocks 
73	
(Goos & Manning, 2009; Dippel et al, 2016). This avenue of research would thereby provide 
a contribution both to the empirical literature on the impact of economic and demographic 
factors on voting patterns but also the debate on the causes and consequences of declining 
manufacturing employment. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
 
Taken together these findings suggest a negative relationship between declining regional 
manufacturing employment and the vote share of social democratic parties in Germany and 
provide some evidence of a similar influence in Austria. They do not, however, suggest a 
positive influence between this factor and the rise of the radical right in these countries. 
Nonetheless, evidence of a positive influence of declining manufacturing employment on the 
radical right vote share was found for Sweden and Finland. Beyond the influence of regional 
industrial dynamics this paper finds no evidence in support of the hypothesis that either the 
decline of social democratic parties or the rise of the radical right can be attributed to 
economic grievances, as measured by unemployment and GDP. Regarding unemployment, 
the effect appears exactly opposite. Some evidence was found for the impact of the crude rate 
of net migration (this papers immigration proxy) on voting patterns; with evidence of a 
positive influence of migration on the radical right vote share of Sweden and France, while 
evidence of a negative influence on the social democratic vote share was found for Germany. 
It is, however, unclear whether this impact is based on cultural or economic factors. Some 
evidence was found for the influence of both university education and age on voting patterns, 
with the impact of these variables differing between countries. Suggesting strong variation in 
the profile of voters, particularly radical right voters, between European countries. The size 
of the influence of these variables on vote share is small, but this is to be expected with 
electoral data and the results can therefore be deemed practically significant.  
 
These findings constitute an original contribution to the literature on the impact of economic 
and demographic factors on voting patterns in Europe. However, this paper was also driven 
by a motivation to provide practical policy recommendations to the labour movement, and 
those interested in halting the advance of xenophobic and Eurosceptic political parties. 
However, the variation in the results discussed in this and the previous section make it 
impossible to provide generalised prescriptions on a European level. On a country level the 
findings suggest that policy makers and labour union officials in Germany, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden should make efforts to see that employers and local educational facilities provide 
lifelong training to ensure that workers have the necessary skills to compete in the rapidly 
changing modern labour market and that they are provided with adequate training and work 
placement schemes should they be rendered surplus to requirement in modern automated 
factory production. The findings also suggest that policy makers in Sweden, France and 
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Germany should provide better investment in integration schemes for new arrivals, nurture 
inter-cultural exchange and ensure that adequate legislation is in place and enforced to 
prevent the exploitation of migrant workers. While these policies may not successfully 
reverse current electoral trends, they will no doubt be welcomed by those who do feel ‘left 
behind’ by technological change and globalisation, however they choose to cast their vote. 
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Data References 
 
Dependent Variable Data - Primary Source: 
 
European Election Database (EED) – Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) 
User Citation: 
Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the 
"European Election Database". The data are collected from original sources, prepared and 
made available by the NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). NSD are not 
responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here. 
 
Dependent Variable Data - Secondary Sources: 
 
Germany: Statistics office of the Federal Returning Officer - Der Bundeswahlleiter - 
Statistisches Bundesamt 
France: Statistical Database of the Ministry of the Interior - Ministère de l'Intérieur 
Statistiques 
Belgium: Belgian Electoral Database - Belgische verkiezingsuitslagen 
Netherlands: The Electoral Council of the Netherlands - Kiesraad 
Austria: Statistical database of the Federal Ministry of the Interior - Bundesministerium für 
Inneres 
Denmark: Danish Statistics Database - Danmarks Statistik 
Sweden: Central Statistics Office - Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB) 
Finland: Statistics Finland - Tilastokeskus 
Czech Republic: Czech Statistical Office - Český statistický úřad 
 
Independent Variable Data: 
 
Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database 
Unemployment rates by sex, age and NUTS 2 regions (%) [lfst_r_lfu3rt] 
Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at regional level (NUTS 3) 
[demo_r_gind3] 
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Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 2 regions 
[nama_10r_2gdp] 
Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions 
[nama_10r_3gdp] 
Population on 1 January by age group, sex and NUTS 2 region [demo_r_pjangroup] 
Population aged 25-64 by educational attainment level, sex and NUTS 2 regions 
(%)[edat_lfse_04] 
 
Additional Graph Data: 
 
Quarterly national accounts by 10 branches - employment data [namq_nace10_e] 
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks – NUTS 2 
 
In order to assess whether the inclusion of the Education variable was causing 
multicollinearity problems a range of robustness checks were carried out. The alternative 
GDP variable was substituted for the GDP variable derived from Eurostat and the regressions 
were run with the Education variable omitted. These checks were carried out for both the 
European and country models. Omission of the Education variable and substitution of the 
GDP variable were not found to substantially change either the coefficients or their statistical 
significance. These tests suggest the models used are robust and that multicollinearity is not 
biasing the results. While a full range of robustness checks were undertaken, for the sake of 
brevity only the regression tables for the model run without the Education variable are 
displayed beneath, all additional robustness checks are available upon request. 
 
87	
 
88	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89	
Appendix B: Robustness Checks – NUTS 3 
 
In order to establish the overall robustness of the models used it was necessary to carry out 
robustness checks. This was done by repeatedly modifying the regression specification by 
removing regressors and observing changes in the coefficients, robust standard errors and 
statistical significance of the remaining variables. In addition to this the alternative GDP and 
migration variables, discussed in section 3 of Chapter 3 were substituted. The resulting 
changes were in almost all instances marginal, with only slight changes in the coefficients 
and robust standard errors occurring and the statistical significance of the remaining variables 
remaining in almost all instances unchanged. Based on these findings it can be concluded that 
the models used in this paper are robust. Given that the results of the regressions carried out 
using the NUTS 3 datasets form the basis of the analysis and conclusions in this paper and 
given that a condensed set of robustness tests for the NUTS 2 datasets are presented in 
Appendix A it is not considered necessary to provide further, more detailed examples of 
robustness checks in this section. While a full range of robustness checks were carried out for 
the NUTS 3 datasets for the sake of space given the large number of tables already presented 
in this paper only a representative sample of robustness checks for the NUTS 3 regressions 
are presented. The following section therefore presents one example for each regression and a 
brief description of the results. 
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Table 21 shows the European parliament panel with the Manufacturing variable removed. 
The coefficients and robust standard errors change only very slightly for all remaining 
variables. The statistical significance of the GDP variable in the radical right regression can 
be seen to have risen, this is the result of a 0.002 change in the p-value. The statistical 
significance of all other variables remains the same. 
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Table 22 shows the results for each country in the European parliament dataset with the 
regressand being social democratic vote share. A different regressor was removed for each 
country. Slight changes to the coefficient and robust standard errors appear for some of the 
variables. The statistical significance of the GDP variable for Germany rises as the result of a 
0.02 change in the p-value, while the age variable appears weakly statistically significant. 
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Table 23 shows the results for each country in the European parliament dataset with the 
regressand being radical right vote share, with a different regressor removed for each country. 
Slight changes appear in the coefficients and robust standard errors of some variables. These 
changes are particularly small in the statistically significant variables, the significance of 
which does not change. The only notable dramatic change can be found for the GDP variable 
for Austria. The coefficient and sign of the variable changes markedly. Given that this 
variable shows no statistical significance in the final results and does not form part of the 
analysis this change need not be considered problematic. 
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Table 24 shows the national elections panel with the age variable removed. Very little change 
occurs in any of the coefficients or robust standard errors for the independent variables, and 
the sign of each coefficient remains the same. The statistical significance of the variables 
similarly remains unchanged, though for the radical right regression the constant gains slight 
statistical significance due to a 0.112 change in the p-value.  
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Table 25 shows the results for each country in the European parliament dataset with the 
regressand being social democratic vote share. A different regressor has been removed for 
each country. Only very marginal changes appear in the coefficients and robust standard 
errors with these being particularly small for the statistically significant variables. 
Furthermore, this statistical significance remains unchanged. The very weak statistical 
significance of the education variable in the Finland regression is lost through the removal of 
unemployment. However, given that this coefficient does not form part of the findings this 
need not be considered problematic. 
 
 
95	
 
 
Table 26 shows the results for each country in the national election dataset with the 
regressand being radical right vote share, with a different regressor removed for each country. 
Again, only very marginal changes occur in the coefficients, robust standard errors and 
statistical significance. One notable exception to this can be found in the manufacturing 
variable in the Sweden regression. With the omission of the unemployment variable the 
coefficient changes by 0.177 and the statistical significance increases. While this may be 
indicative of a lack of sufficient robustness in the specification for Sweden and should make 
one cautious about the interpretation of this coefficient the change is still relatively small. 
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A range of similar robustness checks found similarly marginal changes, with these changes 
being particularly small for the statistically significant variables. Therefore, based on these 
robustness tests the model for the NUTS 3 datasets can be considered robust and 
interpretation and discussion of the results can be justified. 
 
